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PRACTICABLE AND JUSTICIABLE: WHY
NORTH CAROLINA’S CONSTITUTIONAL
VISION OF HIGHER EDUCATION IS
JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE
SOUTH A. MOORE†
ABSTRACT
Two hundred and twenty-five years ago, North Carolina established
the nation’s oldest public university, choosing as its home a particularly
inviting poplar tree in present-day Chapel Hill. Today, UNC-Chapel
Hill is part of a sixteen-campus university system known nationwide
for its commitment to ensuring that public universities remain
financially accessible to the citizens who support them.
That commitment is codified in Article IX, Section 9 of the North
Carolina Constitution, which requires that tuition at the State’s public
universities be “as far as practicable . . . free of expense.” That clause
was first introduced in North Carolina’s 1868 Constitution, nearly
eighty years after UNC-Chapel Hill opened its doors. Before its
imposition, higher education in North Carolina was anything but
affordable. After ratification of the 1868 Constitution, tuition at the
State’s public universities not only decreased, but remained at a steady,
low-price for more than a century: $1450 in 2017 dollars, except for
years when inflation spiked.
This Note argues that Article IX, Section 9 requires the General
Assembly to fund higher education such that tuition does not exceed
this amount, adjusted for inflation—a standard leaders in Raleigh have
failed to meet for nearly two decades.
Should legislators fail to heed this constitutional mandate, students
could successfully challenge the legislature’s refusal to adequately fund
higher education.
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“The General Assembly shall provide that the benefits of The
University of North Carolina and other public institutions of
higher education, as far as practicable, be extended to the
people of the State free of expense.” – N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 9
INTRODUCTION
North Carolina’s constitutional commitment to accessible higher
education began not in 1868, when the above-quoted text first
appeared in the State’s constitution,1 but rather in 1776, when the State
became the second former colony to call for support for a public
university, and the first to call for the founding of one, in its
constitution.2 In the 242 years since, the State has taken its
constitutional obligation to provide affordable higher education
seriously. When the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
(“UNC-Chapel Hill”) reopened in 1875, amid Reconstruction and
after the ratification of the 1868 Constitution, tuition was $60,3 or
$1374.50 in 2017 dollars.4 Between 1916 and 1995, tuition never
exceeded $1450 in today’s dollars.5 Even during the deflation of the
1890s and early 1900s,6 the highest cost of tuition adjusted to today’s

1. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 6, in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND
COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2743, 2817
(Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter THORPE] (“The general assembly shall provide
that the benefits of the university, as far as practicable, be extended to the youth of the State free
of expense for tuition . . . .”).
2. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XLI, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2794 (“[A]ll useful
learning shall be duly encouraged, and promoted, in one or more universities.”).
3. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE
UNIV. OF N.C., 1875-’76, at 13 (1876).
4. Inflation adjustments for years prior to 1913 are based on a conversion tool produced by
the Official Data Foundation, Inflation Calculator, OFFICIAL DATA FOUND., http://
www.in2013dollars.com [https://perma.cc/PDZ9-8W6G], which is based from a historical study by
Professor Robert Sahr. Id.
5. A spreadsheet listing each year’s tuition price—in that year’s dollars as well as in 2017
dollars—based on the author’s independent research analyzing each year’s student handbook,
university catalogue, or each year’s Statistical Abstract of Higher Education in North Carolina, is
on file with Duke Law Journal and is available for reference upon request. Inflation adjustments
for years after 1913 are based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistic’s Consumer Price Index. CPI
Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_
calculator.htm [http://perma.cc/SRG5-AJKZ].
6. See Christopher J. Neely, U.S. Historical Experience with Deflation, FED. RES. BANK OF
ST. LOUIS: ECONOMIC SYNOPSES 1 (Oct. 19, 2010), https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/

MOORE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

PRACTICABLE AND JUSTICIABLE

10/27/2018 1:37 PM

373

dollars would only be $1771,7 significantly less than the more than
$7000 charged today.8
Today, state leaders speak openly of North Carolina’s
constitutional obligation to make college education accessible.
Governor Roy Cooper campaigned on ensuring that the State fulfills
its constitutional promise by increasing funding for universities and
community colleges.9 Former University of North Carolina System
(“UNC System”) President C.D. Spangler describes the provision as
requiring that “[n]o one in our state [be] denied a college education
because of lack of money.”10 Even John Hood, chairman of the fiscally
conservative John Locke Foundation, views the clause as an obligation
that the state legislature fund “a large majority of public college and
university expenses.”11
North Carolina has been rewarded for its commitment to
accessible higher education. The State proudly claims to be home to
the nation’s oldest public university,12 the nation’s first public
university for Native Americans,13 and more of the nation’s four-year
public historically black colleges and universities than any other state.14

publications/es/10/ES1030.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJ48-VKU8] (illustrating the deflationary
episodes in 1890, 1893, and 1907).
7. Between 1890 and 1916, the highest amount of tuition charged, measured in 2017 dollars
according to Inflation Calculator, OFFICIAL DATA FOUND., supra note 4, was $1771. See UNIV.
OF N.C., UNIV. OF N.C. CATALOGUE 1897-98, at 59 (1897) (listing tuition per semester as $30 for
a total of $60 per academic year).
8. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
9. See Prioritizing Our State’s Future, ROY COOPER FOR NORTH CAROLINA,
https://www.roycooper.com/education [https://perma.cc/QKR2-FPKD] (promising to “push to
reverse this economically disastrous trend [of cutting funding for public universities] and
rebalance our state’s priorities,” and averring that “North Carolina must uphold its constitutional
commitment guaranteeing post-secondary education is ‘free as far as practical’”).
10. Margaret Spellings, Margaret Spellings: Higher Education Is a New Civil Right, NEWS &
REC. (Oct. 23, 2016), http://www.greensboro.com/opinion/columns/margaret-spellings-highereducation-is-a-new-civil-right/article_12223df6-8ecb-5d8d-aba7-95ff140990fd.html
[https://
perma.cc/B6JG-5DYX].
11. John Hood, Opinion, Practicable Policy on UNC Tuition, CAROLINA J. (Feb. 15, 2011,
12:00 AM), https://www.carolinajournal.com/opinion-article/practicable-policy-on-unc-tuition
[https://perma.cc/2THQ-KKSN].
12. WILLIAM D. SNIDER, LIGHT ON THE HILL: A HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH
CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL 3 (1992).
13. History, UNIV. OF N.C. AT PEMBROKE, http://www.uncp.edu/about-uncp/history
[https://perma.cc/85BG-7NJ7].
14. See College Navigator, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDU. STATISTICS, https://nces.ed.gov/
COLLEGENAVIGATOR (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) [select “Public” and “4-year” for
“Institution Type” and “Historically Black College or University” for “Specialized Mission,” then
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The benefits extend beyond pride; support for affordable higher
education has paid enormous dividends for the State’s economy. Two
of its public universities, UNC-Chapel Hill and North Carolina State
University (“NC State”), are two of three universities whose research
prowess attracted pharmaceutical companies to the famed Research
Triangle Park.15 The Research Triangle Park transformed North
Carolina, once one of the country’s poorest states, into the envy of the
American South by attracting 250 technological and pharmaceutical
companies, not to mention 50,000 jobs, to the State’s Piedmont
region.16
Then came the Great Recession of 2008, which decimated state
revenue. Forced to balance its budget, the General Assembly made
drastic cuts to appropriations for higher education. Since 2007, per
pupil funding has decreased by 20 percent when adjusted for inflation.17
To account for lost revenue, state universities have raised tuition costs.
While tuition at North Carolina’s public universities remains low
relative to other states,18 it has still increased nearly 75 percent in the
past decade,19 or roughly 38 percent adjusted for inflation—a larger
increase than was seen in thirty-seven other states.20 In 2007–2008,

follow “Search”] (showing that North Carolina has five Historically Black Colleges or
Universities, the highest among all states).
15. Research Triangle Park, DURHAM CONVENTION & VISITORS BUREAU,
https://www.durham-nc.com/maps-info/districts/research-triangle-park [https://perma.cc/8RL7MLX3].
16. About Us, RESEARCH TRIANGLE PARK, https://www.rtp.org/about-us [https://
perma.cc/V9LT-5TWY].
17. Michael Mitchell, Michael Leachman & Kathleen Masterson, Funding Down, Tuition
Up: State Cuts to Higher Education Threaten Quality and Affordability at Public Colleges, CTR.
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budgetand-tax/funding-down-tuition-up [https://perma.cc/QNV2-4NK5].
18. Jason Debruyn, Incoming UNC Students Likely to See Tuition Increase, WUNC (Jan. 13,
2017), http://wunc.org/post/incoming-unc-students-likely-see-tuition-increase#stream/0 [https://
perma.cc/6R4R-QYCC].
19. Id.
20. Mitchell, Leachman & Masterson, supra note 17.
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average in-state tuition at UNC System21 institutions was $2393,22 while
in 2017–2018 it was $4352.23 Yearly tuition at UNC-Chapel Hill is
currently $7018—nearly three thousand dollars more than the System
average.24 In 2014, the cost of sending a child to one of the State’s fouryear public universities amounted to between 21 and 25.7 percent of
the average North Carolina family’s annual income.25
Of course, North Carolina was far from the only state to impose
cuts on state support for public higher education during the Great
Recession of 2008. Drastic increases in the cost of tuition at public
universities nationwide have pushed college affordability to the fore of
public attention. Adjusted for inflation, average state spending per
student is down 18 percent from a decade ago.26 That has likely led to
commensurate increases in tuition.27 While Americans may have
become accustomed to hefty price tags at private universities or out-

21. What constitutes the University of North Carolina has changed over time. What is
presently UNC-Chapel Hill was founded in 1789. 220 Years of History, U. OF N.C. SYS.,
https://www.northcarolina.edu/about-our-system/220-years-history
[https://perma.cc/8TVXDM2Y]. In 1933, the legislature brought UNC-Chapel Hill, the Women’s College, and North
Carolina State University under the umbrella of UNC. Id. By the late 1960s, three more state
funded universities joined the system. Id. Finally, in 1971 the remaining ten public universities
joined what is now known as the UNC System. Id. References to the “University” before 1933
thus refer to UNC-Chapel Hill. After 1933, references to the “University” refer to the UNC
System.
22. UNIV. OF N.C., TUITION & FEES APPLICABLE TO ALL REGULAR FULL-TIME
UNDERGRADUATE
STUDENTS
2007-08,
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/fiscalresearch/
Statistics_and_Data/statistics_and_data_pdfs/education/2007-08%20Undergraduate%20and
%20Graduate%20tuition.pdf [https://perma.cc/PT2G-B3FD].
23. UNIV. OF N.C., TUITION & FEES APPLICABLE TO ALL REGULAR FULL-TIME
UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS 2017-18, https://www.northcarolina.edu/sites/default/files/201718_ug_tuition_and_fees.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KWG-YBAW].
24. UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, TUITION & FEES ACADEMIC YEAR 2017-2018,
https://cashier.unc.edu/files/2017/07/17_18YR.pdf [https://perma.cc/HXB5-B2UH] (noting that
the tuition for full-time students who are NC residents was $3509.50).
25. S. REG’L EDUC. BD., NORTH CAROLINA COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY PROFILE 2017, at 1
(2017),
https://www.sreb.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/nc_2017_afford_profile.pdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YP9Z-4SJ8].
26. Mitchell, Leachman & Masterson, supra note 17.
27. See Doug Webber, Fancy Dorms Aren’t the Main Reason Tuition is Skyrocketing,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 13, 2016, 11:03 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/fancy-dormsarent-the-main-reason-tuition-is-skyrocketing [https://perma.cc/9MY4-LAWP] (noting that “by
far the single biggest driver of rising tuitions for public colleges has been declining state funding
for higher education”). But see Jason Delisle, The Disinvestment Hypothesis: Don’t Blame State
Budget Cuts for Rising Tuition at Public Universities, BROOKINGS INST. (June 1, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-disinvestment-hypothesis-dont-blame-state-budgetcuts-for-rising-tuition-at-public-universities [https://perma.cc/JU7J-7NUX] (presenting a rebuke
of this theory and other theories for the rise in tuition at public universities).
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of-state institutions, the average in-state tuition at public universities
now exceeds $10,000,28 a 33 percent increase from a decade ago, when
adjusted for inflation.29 In light of the increasing cost of higher
education, both nationwide and in North Carolina, greater attention
has been paid to the requirement in Article IX, Section 9 of the North
Carolina Constitution that a university education be provided as free
as practicable. In fact, in 2014, an advocacy group, named Higher
Education Works, was founded in North Carolina with the explicit
purpose of educating legislators and the public about Article IX,
Section 9.30
Adherence to a clause requires understanding its meaning. Article
IX, Section 9 has never been the subject of litigation, so courts have
never had the opportunity to explain what, if any, legal obligations the
clause imposes. Arizona’s constitution contains a substantially similar
clause requiring the State to provide citizens with a university
education for “as nearly free as possible.”31 However, in Kromko v.
Arizona Board of Regents, the Arizona Supreme Court, borrowing the
logic underlying the federal political questions doctrine, ruled that the
clause contained no “judicially discoverable and manageable
standards” and thus presented the court with a non-justiciable political
question.32
But, in North Carolina, the historical, and therefore legal,
landscape is different. North Carolina’s constitutional history
demonstrates an intent to maintain low tuition prices by imposing
constitutional constraints on the General Assembly’s ability to shift

28. Briana Boyington, See 20 Years of Tuition Growth at National Universities, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Sept. 20, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/payingfor-college/articles/2017-09-20/see-20-years-of-tuition-growth-at-national-universities
[https://
perma.cc/H9LL-XZYT].
29. Mitchell, Leachman & Masterson, supra note 17.
30. See About, HIGHER EDUC. WORKS, http://www.highereducationworks.org/about
[https://perma.cc/MMM8-87BF] (“We advocate for investment in North Carolina’s public
universities and community colleges by building support among citizens and engaging leaders.”).
31. ARIZ. CONST., art. XI, § 6.
32. Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 165 P.3d 168, 172 (Ariz. 2007). The court explained its
use of the federal political question doctrine, saying, “[t]he federal political question doctrine
flows from the [same] basic principle of separation of powers . . . [as] [o]ur state Constitution.”
Id. at 170−71. For reasons that are not always clear, many states employ the federal political
question doctrine, at least in addressing challenges to the adequacy of funding for education under
their state constitutions. See, e.g., id.; Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 279, 288
(Haw. 2012) (addressing some of the factors from the Supreme Court’s explanation of the federal
political question doctrine in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d
249, 253 (N.C. 1997) (same).
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funding away from higher education. Specifically, the constitutional
history reveals that tuition of roughly $1450 per year, in 2017 dollars,
constitutes the tuition “as free as far as practicable” envisioned by
Article IX, Section 9.
After North Carolina ratified a new constitution in 1868, a
constitution that significantly limited the legislature’s discretion in
regards to funding for higher education, the cost of tuition did not rise
significantly for more than 100 years. Yearly tuition at UNC-Chapel
Hill largely remained below $1450 in present dollars until 1995. That
amount represents a judicially discoverable and manageable
standard—we can judge future tuition increases against the
consistently low tuition of the first 100+ years after ratification.
Part I traces the history of public funding of higher education in
North Carolina both before and after the ratification of the 1868
Constitution. This Part also highlights concerns about university
funding that the drafters of the 1868 Constitution sought to address
while also briefly discussing efforts by the federal government to
encourage states to support public education from 1787–1892. Part II
analyzes possible roadblocks to litigation over the meaning of Article
IX, Section 9—specifically standing and the related political question
doctrine. Part III then draws upon the text of Article IX, Section 9, as
well as North Carolina’s unique history of support for public higher
education, to determine that the provision imposes a constitutional
obligation to keep tuition “free, as far as practicable.” And, finally, Part
IV discusses three possible remedies a court could employ to address
the General Assembly’s neglect of its constitutional obligation:
judicially mandating a change, placing a renewed burden upon the
legislature, or procedurally altering the funding process.
I. PUBLIC EDUCATION FUNDING AND THE NORTH CAROLINA
CONSTITUTION
The language of Article IX, Section 9 first appeared in North
Carolina’s 1868 Constitution. The drafters of that Constitution
included it, as well as a number of other provisions, in an attempt to
compel the legislature to properly fund the University, something the
legislature had failed to do under the far more vague 1776
Constitution.33 Article IX, Section 9 thus must be understood in light
33. See SNIDER, supra note 12, at 57 (“Except for an early $10,000 loan [from the legislature]
later converted into a gift, the campus had survived on funds from escheated lands and arrearages,
private benefactions, two lotteries, and tuition fees.”).
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of the flaws of the State’s first constitution and the ways in which its
second attempted to correct for them. The first and second Sections of
this Part discuss that history. Because two of the provisions added to
the Education section of North Carolina’s 1868 Constitution draw
upon national trends in education, the second Section of this Part also
briefly describes the history of federal support for public education—
both K–12 and higher education—in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Of course, North Carolina has since ratified a third
constitution, this one drafted in 1971 with the intent largely to preserve
the rights guaranteed by the 1868 Constitution.34 The final Section of
this Part discusses this constitution and the understanding of state
funding for higher education its drafters sought to preserve.
A. The Constitution of 1776
North Carolina’s commitment to providing its citizens with
affordable public higher education began in 1776, when it included in
its constitution a call to establish a public university in the State: “a
school or schools [shall] be established by the Legislature, for the
convenient instruction of youth, with such salaries to the masters, paid
by the public, as may enable them to instruct at low prices; and all
useful learning shall be duly encouraged, and promoted, in one or more
universities.”35
The legislature, recognizing the urgency of the constitution’s
language, acted quickly after the end of the American Revolution to
establish and fund the University of North Carolina, which would later
become the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Accordingly,
in 1789, the legislature passed a bill establishing a university, writing in
the bill’s preamble that “an [sic] University supported by permanent
funds and well-endowed would have the most direct tendency to”
ensure its graduates are fit for “honourable discharge of the social
duties of life.”36 Eleven days later, the legislature fulfilled the
preamble’s promise of a “well-endowed” University by passing what is

34. See John V. Orth, North Carolina Constitutional History, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1759, 1790
(1992) (“[The 1971 constitution] was instead a good-government measure, long-matured and
carefully crafted by the state’s leading lawyers and politicians, designed to consolidate and
conserve the best features of the past, not to break with it.”).
35. N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XLI, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2794.
36. William R. Davie’s Bill to Establish the University of North Carolina (Nov. 12, 1789), in
1 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 1776-1799, at 23
(R.D.W. Connor, Louis R. Wilson & Hugh T. Lefler eds., Univ. N.C. Press 1953).
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popularly known as the Escheats Act.37 The act awarded to the
University “all the property that has heretofore or shall hereafter
escheat to the state.”38
Not long after its founding, however, the State stopped providing
sufficient funds to the University. In 1796, the legislature attempted to
reclaim the escheats granted in 1789, an action the North Carolina
Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional.39 The legislature was only
briefly thwarted. While the University retained the prior escheats, the
legislature did not appropriate any other funds for the University until
after the Civil War.40 Multiple University presidents tried—and
failed—to obtain additional funds from the legislature, despite
consistent increases in enrollment.41
The lack of funding hampered the University, and its quality
suffered. So desperate was the University that it took students in need
of “remedial instruction.”42 The campus was in disrepair, requiring
then University President Joseph Caldwell to travel the State in 1814
begging for money just to complete the roof of the campus’s main
building.43 Occasionally, the University even had to borrow money to
pay faculty salaries.44 In addition, it was perceived by at least some as
accessible only to North Carolina’s elite.45 By 1833, tuition had risen to

37. SNIDER, supra note 12, at 11.
38. AN ACT FOR THE ENDOWMENT OF THE UNIVERSITY, in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 1776-1799, supra note 36, at 45.
39. See REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION 138
(1968) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION] (noting that the North Carolina
Supreme Court invalidated the legislature’s attempt to repeal the escheats statute of 1789 “on the
ground that it constituted a taking of vested property other than by the law of the land, in violation
of the constitution”).
40. See SNIDER, supra note 12, at 57 (“Except for an early $10,000 loan [from the legislature]
later converted into a gift, the campus had survived on funds from escheated lands and arrearages,
private benefactions, two lotteries, and tuition fees.”), 59 (“The student body grew from about 89
at the time of [UNC President Swain’s] arrival to over 450 by the opening of the Civil War. . . .
However, Swain failed to obtain support from the General Assembly, no matter how hard he
tried.”).
41. See id. at 29 (“[I]n July 1795 . . . the enrollment had risen to forty-one . . . .”), 59 (“The
student body grew from about 89 at the time of [UNC President Swain’s] arrival to over 450 by
the opening of the Civil War.”).
42. Id. at 29; see id. at 59 (“Scholastic standards were low and seemed to be kept that way as
‘if in appeal for more students.’”).
43. Id. at 43.
44. Id. at 51.
45. Id. at 81 (citing a contemporary newspaper report describing pre-Civil War perceptions
of the University as catering only to landed elites).
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$30.46 Five years later it jumped to $50.47 By the end of the Civil War,
it was $100.48 These compounding financial woes and lack of support
from the legislature ultimately led David Swain, who served as
University President from 1835 to 1868, to conclude that the University
must survive “on its own.”49
B. The 1868 Constitution
The University was not left on its own for long. In the late 1860s,
the United States required the defeated states of the Confederacy to
draft new state constitutions.50 Drafters of North Carolina’s
Reconstruction-era constitution took this opportunity to correct for
the harm caused by the legislature’s failure to fund the University.
They accomplished this through the addition of an entire article
devoted to “Education,” which included a number of provisions
designed to constrain the legislature’s discretion in funding higher
education.51
One goal behind imposing these new constraints was to change the
perception of some that higher education was only meant for elites. For
example, the drafters declared that the State must provide a university
education to its citizens free of expense, “as far as practicable.”52
Because of its high tuition prices, some viewed attendance at the

46. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 1833-34, at 10
(1832) (listing tuition “per session,” comparable to a semester, as $15).
47. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 1838-39, at 14 (1838).
48. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA 1864-66, at 30
(1866).
49. See SNIDER, supra note 12, at 59 (“However, Swain failed to obtain support from the
General Assembly, no matter how hard he tried. The university, he soon learned, must live ‘on
its own,’ as it had from its birth.”).
50. Reconstruction Acts of 1867-68, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2 (1867).
51. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 5, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817–18 (“The
University of North Carolina . . . shall be held to an inseparable connection with the free publicschool system of the State.”); id. art. IX, § 6 (“[A]ll the property which has heretofore accrued to
the State, or shall hereafter accrue, from escheats, unclaimed dividends, or distributive shares of
the estates of deceased persons, shall be appropriated to the use of the university.”); id. art. IX,
§ 16 (“As soon as practicable after the adoption of this constitution, the general assembly shall
establish and maintain, in connection with the university, a department of agriculture, of
mechanics, of mining, and of normal instruction.”); see also infra notes 75–76 and accompanying
text (explaining that instructing the General Assembly to establish a department of agriculture,
mechanics, mining, and normal instruction was tantamount to a directive to ensure the State
qualified for funds under the Morrill Act of 1868).
52. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 6, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817.
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University as accessible only to the State’s wealthy citizens.53 This
provision reaffirmed the State’s intention to ensure the University was
accessible to all.
Other changes directly addressed the failings of the 1776
Constitution. The second clause of the newly added article on
Education required that the State continue to give the University the
escheats that the state legislature had attempted, but failed, to take
back, guaranteeing that “all property which has heretofore accrued to
the State, or shall hereafter accrue from escheats . . . shall be
appropriated to the use of the University.”54 By enshrining this reversal
in the State’s constitution, the drafters ensured that, absent a
constitutional amendment, the University could never be deprived of
the State’s escheats.
Some of the constraints stemmed from the federal government’s
efforts to encourage state support for public education. Article IX,
Section 5 declared, “[t]he University of North Carolina . . . shall be held
to an inseparable connection with the free public school system of the
State.”55 That clause might seem merely aspirational today, but it
signified a very specific meaning to those who wrote it. Over the course
of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the federal government
used land grants to encourage states to establish comprehensive
systems of public education, including universities.56 This effort
resulted in states inserting into their constitutions commitments to
comprehensive systems of public education.57 It began with the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which provided that, in the new U.S.
territories, “schools and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged.”58 The federal government succeeded in instilling a
commitment to state-supported education in these territories—every

53. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
54. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 6, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817.
55. Id. art. IX, § 5, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817.
56. See Adam Sherman & Hugh Spitzer, Washington State’s Mandate: The Constitutional
Obligation to Fund Post-Secondary Education, 89 WASH. L. REV. ONLINE 15, 18–20 (2014)
(explaining how sale of land allocated to each state’s congressional delegation funded the
“creation of land-grant colleges”).
57. See id. at 20 (“[B]etween 1860 and 1889, every state . . . except West Virginia, referenced
colleges or universities in their founding constitutions. . . . Perhaps nothing illustrates the growing
national call for institutions of higher education more than the Morrill Act of 1862[,] . . . [which]
spurred state after state to enter the higher education field.”).
58. Northwest Ordinance of 1789, Ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (1789) (reenacting the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787).
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state created by the Northwest Ordinance included a section about
supporting public education in its constitution.59
In the years following that success, the federal government
attempted to do the same with higher education, granting anywhere
from 40,000 to 100,000 acres of land each to seventeen territoriesturned-states before the outbreak of the Civil War.60 Fifteen of the
seventeen mentioned higher education in their founding constitution.61
Some state constitutions, like Alabama’s 1819 Constitution, even
called for additional state support of the universities founded through
federal land grants.62
The Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862,63 which gave states western
lands to be sold to fund agricultural and mechanical education, was the

59. See generally IND. CONST. of 1851, art. VIII, § 1, in 2 THORPE, supra note 1, at 1086 (“[I]t
shall be the duty of the General Assembly . . . to provide by law for a general and uniform system
of common schools, wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all.”); MICH.
CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 1, in 4 THORPE, supra note 1, at 1961 (“The superintendent of public
instruction shall have the general supervision of public instruction, and his duties shall be
prescribed by law.”); OHIO CONST. of 1851, art. VI, § 2, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2925 (“The
General Assembly shall make such provisions . . . [that] will secure a thorough and efficient
system of common schools throughout the state . . . .”); WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. X, § 1, in 7
THORPE, supra note 1, at 4103 (“The supervision of public instruction shall be vested in a state
superintendent and such other officers as the legislature shall direct . . . .”).
60. JOHN R. THELIN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 75–76 (2d ed. 2011).
61. See generally ALA. CONST. of 1875, art. XII, § 9, in 1 THORPE, supra note 1, at 177 (“the
State University and the Agricultural and Mechanical College”); ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. XIV,
§ 2, in 1 THORPE, supra note 1, at 358 (“schools or universities”); CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. IX, §
9, in 1 THORPE, supra note 1, at 432 (“the University of California”); FLA. CONST. of 1885, art.
XII, § 14, in 2 THORPE, supra note 1, at 754 (permitting the establishment of two “normal
schools,” which were institutions of higher education focused on training primary school
teachers); ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VIII, § 2, in 2 THORPE, supra note 1, at 1035 (“college,
seminary, or university purposes”); IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. IX, § 11, in 2 THORPE, supra note
1, at 1151 (“[t]he State University”); LA. CONST. of 1879, art. 230, in 3 THORPE, supra note 1, at
1509 (“[t]he University of Louisiana”); MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 7, in 4 THORPE, supra
note 1, at 1961 (“the University of Michigan”); MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. VIII, § 4, in 4 THORPE,
supra note 1, at 2009 (“the University of Minnesota”); MISS. CONST. of 1868, art. VIII, § 8, in 4
THORPE, supra note 1, at 2081 (“an agricultural college or colleges”); MO. CONST. of 1875, art.
XI, § 5, in 4 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2263 (“the State University”); OR. CONST. of 1857, art.
VIII, § 5, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 3011 (“university lands” and “university funds”); TENN.
CONST. of 1870, art. XI, § 12, in 6 THORPE, supra note 1, at 3469 (“The above provisions shall not
prevent the Legislature from carrying into effect any laws that have been passed in favor of the
colleges, universities, or academies . . . .”); WIS. CONST. of 1848, art. X, § 6, in 7 THORPE, supra
note 1, at 4092 (“a state university”).
62. See ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. VI, in 1 THORPE, supra note 1, at 110 (“The general
assembly shall . . . [use money raised from federally granted lands] for the exclusive support of a
State University.”).
63. Land-Grant Agricultural and Mechanical College (Morrill) Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37130, 12 Stat. 503 (codified at 7 U.S.C §§ 301–308 (2012)).
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federal government’s most ambitious attempt to encourage support for
higher education. The act doled out 30,000 acres per representative in
Congress64—over 17,400,000 acres, worth more than $7.5 million in
1862 dollars.65 The Morrill Land Grant Act, like the Northwest
Ordinance and the individual land grants before it, influenced state
constitutions. In the three decades between the first and second Morrill
Land Grand Acts,66 all but one state constitution drafted and ratified
included a provision related to higher education.67
Thus, by the end of the nineteenth century, language tying
together public universities and the public K–12 education system was
common. Though their constitutions were drafted after North
Carolina’s, Colorado and Washington’s inclusion of universities and
normal schools68 within their visions for comprehensive systems of
public education is indicative of the fact that drafters of state
constitutions during this time understood systems of public education
to include higher education. Article IX of Colorado’s constitution calls
for maintenance of a “thorough and uniform” public education
system.69 Meanwhile, in Article VIII, the drafters included three
colleges among the educational institutions that must be “supported by

64. Id. § 1, 12 Stat. at 503
65. MICHAEL L. WHALEN, A LAND-GRANT UNIVERSITY 7 (2002), reprinted from CORNELL
UNIVERSITY 2001-02 FINANCIAL PLAN (2001).
66. The second Morrill Act focused on promoting agricultural and mechanical education for
African Americans. See Agricultural College (Morrill) Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 51-841, 26 Stat.
417 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 321–328 (2012)) (requiring states that benefited from the
Morrill Act of 1862 that also have segregated colleges to divide funds from the Act evenly
between “one college for white students and one institution for colored students”).
67. See generally COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. IX, § 12, in 1 THORPE, supra note 1, at 496 (“the
University of Colorado”); KAN. CONST. of 1858, art. VII, § 7, in 2 THORPE, supra note 1, at 1232
(“a complete system of public instruction, embracing . . . collegiate and university departments”);
MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XI, § 11, in 4 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2324 (“the State University”);
NEB. CONST. of 1866–67, art. II §§ 1–2, in 4 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2358 (dictating the minimum
price at which “university lands” may be sold); NEV. CONST. of 1864, art. XI, § 4, in 4 THORPE,
supra note 1, at 2419 (“a State University”); N.D. CONST. of 1889, art. 8, § 148, in 5 THORPE, supra
note 1, at 2872 (“a uniform system for free public schools . . . including the normal and collegiate
course”); S.D. CONST. of 1889, art. VIII, § 7, in 6 THORPE, supra note 1, at 3374 (“[resources] from
the United States or any other source for a university”).
68. Normal schools were institutions of higher education focused on the training of primary
school teachers. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
69. COLO. CONST. of 1876, art. IX, § 2, in 1 THORPE, supra note 1, at 494.
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the State.”70 Washington’s constitution uses similar language.71 This
language was not only commonplace, but also held real implications
for the funding of public universities. For nearly two decades after the
drafting of its constitution, Washington’s universities were tuitionfree72 and legislation “lumped” the University of Washington’s funding
in with the “general and uniform system of public schools,” which
included “common schools, high schools, normal schools, and technical
schools.”73
Thus, when drafters of North Carolina’s 1868 Constitution
announced their intent to hold the University “to an inseparable
connection with the free public-school system of the State,”74 they
intended to constitutionalize a commitment to affordable education at
every level, including universities. The final provision the drafters
added in relation to higher education flows directly from the first
Morrill Land Grant Act. Section 16 instructed that “[a]s soon as
practicable after the adoption of this Constitution, the general
assembly shall establish and maintain, in connection with the
university, a department of agriculture, of mechanics, of mining and of
normal instruction.”75 This clause made the State eligible for funds
from the Morrill Act.76 The General Assembly took the “as soon as
practicable” language here seriously; it made the reopening of the
University in 1875 contingent upon its ability to provide agricultural
and mechanical education.77
70. Id. art. VIII, § 1, in 1 THORPE, supra note 1, at 493; see also id. art. VIII, § 5, in 1 THORPE,
supra note 1, at 494 (“The University at Boulder [and other institutions] . . . [are] subject to the
control of the State.”).
71. See WASH. CONST. of 1889, art. XIII, in 7 THORPE, supra note 1, at 3998 (listing
educational institutions that “shall be fostered and supported by the state”); see also Sherman &
Spitzer, supra note 56, at 28–29 (reciting the language of Article XIII, Section 1 of the Washington
State Constitution).
72. Sherman & Spitzer, supra note 56, at 35.
73. Id. at 27–28.
74. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 5, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817.
75. Id. art. IX, § 16, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2818.
76. The language of Section 16 requires the teaching of “agriculture” and “mechanics.” Id.
The Morrill Act of 1862 required states “to teach such branches of learning as are related to
agriculture and the mechanic arts” in order to receive the lands. Land-Grant Agricultural and
Mechanical College (Morrill) Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-130, § 4, 12 Stat. 503, 504 (codified at 7
U.S.C § 304 (2012)).
77. William D. Snider documented the incidents surrounding the reopening of the
University:
After prolonged study the trustees saw their only hope in persuading the General
Assembly to revalidate the agricultural and mechanical college Land Scrip Fund,
obtained by Governor Swain from the federal government in 1867 under the Morrill
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The drafters succeeded in making higher education more
affordable. In 1869, the Governor declared at commencement, in
remarks reproduced in the North Carolina Standard, that, pre-1868 the
University “practically excluded . . . the children of the great body of
people.”78 However, with the ratification of the State’s Reconstruction
constitution, he declared the University to be “a popular institution . .
. . It is now the people’s University.”79 The state legislature
appropriated $7500 annually to the University in addition to the
escheats.80 When the University reopened in 1875, tuition dropped
from the $100 charged in 186881 or the $80 charged just before the
University’s brief closure in 187082 to $60.83 In 1924, tuition was $80.84
Even at the height of the Great Depression, tuition was only $75.85
C. The Constitution of 1971
North Carolina’s current constitution was drafted in 1968 by a
study commission appointed by the North Carolina Bar Association
and North Carolina State Bar.86 It was, as one commentator put it, “a
good-government measure, long-matured and carefully crafted by the
state’s leading lawyers and politicians, designed to consolidate and

Act. [Due to the Board of Trustees having lost that money in a bond scandal t]he state
remained responsible to the federal government for restoring the principal, but in a
closely contested fight the General Assembly authorized the state to pay an annual sum
of $7500 to the university as interest on the money, provided the university offered
agricultural and mechanical instruction.
SNIDER, supra note 12, at 89–90 (emphasis added). UNC-Chapel Hill’s use of Morrill Act funds
would remain a controversy until those irked by UNC-Chapel Hill’s perceived lack of
commitment to agricultural education persuaded the legislature to launch a university focused
specifically on agricultural and mechanical instruction. SCOTT M. GELBER, THE UNIVERSITY
AND THE PEOPLE: ENVISIONING AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION IN AN ERA OF POPULIST
PROTEST 37 (2011). That university became what is presently North Carolina State University. Id.
78. The University Commencement, N.C. STANDARD 2 (June 12, 1869).
79. Id.
80. SNIDER, supra note 12, at 90.
81. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE
UNIV. OF N.C. 1867-’68, at 24 (1870).
82. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE
UNIV. OF N.C. 1869-’70, at 15 (1870).
83. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE
UNIV. OF N.C., 1875-’76, at 13 (1876).
84. UNIV. OF N.C., THE CATALOGUE 1923-1924, at 61 (1924) (showing an annual tuition in
1924 of $20 per quarter, for a total of $80 per year).
85. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE ISSUE 1933-1934, at 29, 44 (1934) (listing tuition as $25 per
quarter, comprising one third of the academic year).
86. CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at i.
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conserve the best features of the past, not to break with it.”87 The
Commission itself explained that “none [of the changes are] calculated
to impair any present right of the individual citizen or to bring about
any fundamental change in the power of state and local government or
the distribution of that power.”88
Changes to Article IX were limited and mostly served to
constitutionalize contemporary practices. The Commission’s
commentary on Article IX provides just one mention of higher
education, explaining that wording changes to what is currently Section
9 exist only “to take account of the duty of the State to maintain
institutions of higher education in addition to the University of North
Carolina.”89 In 1868, North Carolina had just one university; drafters
of the 1971 Constitution were merely noting that it was now home to
sixteen.90 Otherwise, the Commission saw no need to change the
constitution’s requirement that the General Assembly provide citizens
with a university education as free as practicable.
Perhaps that was because the clause was working. At the time the
State’s constitution was being redrafted and ratified, tuition prices
were, adjusted for inflation, remarkably similar to prices when the
University reopened in 1875. At $225 per year when the constitution
was ratified in 1971,91 the cost was only eleven dollars more than the
inflation-adjusted cost in 1875.92
The Commission also eliminated clauses that were no longer
needed. Gone was the requirement that the legislature work with the
University to create a program of agricultural and mechanical
instruction;93 the clause was no longer necessary because, by 1971,
87. Orth, supra note 34, at 1790.
88. CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 10.
89. Id. at 88.
90. See id. (“Proposed Sec. 8 extends present Sec. 6 (which deals only with the University)
to take account of the duty of the State to maintain institutions of higher education in addition to
the University of North Carolina.”). By 1968, North Carolina had sixteen public universities; three
were joined to create the University of North Carolina in 1931, three more joined the University
by the late 1960s, and the remaining ten public universities joined the University in 1971. 220
Years of History, supra note 21.
91. UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, THE UNDERGRADUATE BULLETIN 132 (1970).
92. An amount of $60 in 1875 would be worth $214.40 in 1971, adjusted for inflation using
information provided in supra note 4.
93. Compare N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 16, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2818 (“As
soon as practicable after the adoption of this constitution, the general assembly shall establish and
maintain, in connection with the university, a department of agriculture, of mechanics, of mining,
and of normal instruction.”), with N.C. CONST. art. IX (omitting such references to agriculture
and mechanics).
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North Carolina was home to not one, but two, specialized institutions
devoted to mechanical and agricultural education.94
The Commission also acknowledged that UNC-Chapel Hill had
changed how it used escheats. Because of generous funding from the
State, the Trustees of UNC-Chapel Hill, in 1946, had ceased to draw
upon the principal of escheats. Instead, the Trustees began to use
funding from escheat interest only to provide scholarships to lowincome students, and not to fund the University’s operations.95 The
Commission, therefore, recommended that the State be granted any
escheats after 1970, with the condition that the escheats be used to
provide need-based scholarships to low-income North Carolina
students attending one of the State’s public universities.96 North
Carolina’s citizens ratified the recommendations via referendum on
Election Day 1970.97
D. Increases in Tuition in the Present Day
In the late 1990s, tuition at UNC-Chapel Hill began to rise more
rapidly. In 1996, tuition first broke the $1000 mark.98 While tuition in
1994–1995, $874,99 was slightly less than double the amount from ten

94. See Jimmy Ryals, Land-Grant Legacy, N.C. ST. NEWS (July 2, 2012), https://news.
ncsu.edu/2012/07/land-grant-legacy [https://perma.cc/WN9J-KWKM] (“The Morrill Act
universities were established to teach agricultural and mechanical arts . . . . In North Carolina, the
law birthed the North Carolina College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts (now NC State). A
second Morrill Act in 1890 led to the establishment of North Carolina Agricultural and Technical
State University.”).
95. See CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 138–39 (“Until 1946, both the
principal and interest of the escheats were used for any purpose by the University Trustees. In
[1946], however, the Trustees determined that the principal of the escheats fund should be kept
intact, that the net income should be distributed among the three . . . campuses of The University
in proportion to enrollment, and that it should be used only for scholarships to needy North
Carolina residents . . . .”).
96. Id. at 137, 139 (“We believe that equity requires that the benefits of the escheats, being
derived from property owners throughout the entire State, be made available to any needy and
worthy North Carolinian who is enrolled in any public institution of higher education in this
State.”).
97. The North Carolina Constitution was presented to voters and approved in 1970. Orth,
supra note 34, at 1760.
98. UNIV. OF N.C., UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL TUITION AND FEES 1996-1997 (1996)
https://cashier.unc.edu/files/2016/05/AY-1996-97-and-summer-1997.pdf [https://perma.cc/2B6ZFL7W] (showing tuition per semester for a full load as $693, for a total of $1386).
99. UNIV. OF N.C., UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL TUITION AND FEES 1994-1995 (1994)
https://cashier.unc.edu/files/2016/05/AY-1994-95-and-summer-1995.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RWZWQMC] (showing tuition per semester for a full load as $437, for a total of $874).
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years prior,100 tuition in 2005, $3205, was nearly four times as much as
it had been a decade earlier.101
The Great Recession of 2008 exacerbated this problem. In its
wake, the General Assembly reduced funding for higher education,
leading the UNC System to impose tuition increases.102 Whereas in
2008, a North Carolina family would need to devote 15 percent of its
income to sending a child to a four-year public university, by 2014, the
number was 25.7 percent.103 The increases led some to ask whether
“working families [can] still afford UNC?”104
II. PROCEDURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO BRINGING AN ARTICLE IX,
SECTION 9 CHALLENGE
This Part explains why two common procedural impediments do
not bar a challenge alleging that the North Carolina State Legislature
has failed to adhere to Article IX, Section 9.
First, this Part quickly disposes of concerns that students—the
most obvious plaintiffs in hypothetical litigation regarding Article IX,
Section 9—might lack standing. It then demonstrates how an Article
IX, Section 9 challenge can survive the political question doctrine.
Because North Carolina’s courts have historically played an important
role in expounding on the meaning of the State’s constitution and
because there is sufficient historical evidence to identify judicially
discoverable and manageable standards within the clause, a challenge
under Article IX, Section 9 likely succeeds where the Kromko
litigation in Arizona failed.

100. UNIV. OF N.C., UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL TUITION AND FEES 1984-1985 (1984)
https://cashier.unc.edu/files/2016/05/AY-1984-85-and-summer-1985.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7MAXFLA] (showing tuition per semester for a full load as $240, for a total of $480).
101. UNIV. OF N.C., UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL TUITION AND FEES 2004-2005 (2004)
https://cashier.unc.edu/files/2016/05/AY-2004-05-and-summer-2005-includes-importantdates.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VA8-6TT3] (showing tuition per semester for a full load as $1602.50,
for a total of $3205).
102. See Rob Christensen, Can Working Families Still Afford UNC?, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Mar. 10, 2015) https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/politics-columnsblogs/rob-christensen/article13229168.html [https://perma.cc/CEF3-X4NP] (“The tuition
increases are a means of compensating for declining state funding and rising costs. State
appropriations to the UNC system have declined since 2008-2009 . . . .”).
103. S. REG’L EDUC. BD., supra note 25, at 1.
104. Christensen, supra note 102.
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A. Standing
Standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief would not pose a
significant impediment to students looking to challenge the
legislature’s adherence to Article IX, Section 9. The North Carolina
Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act provides that “the right of a
citizen and taxpayer to maintain an action in the courts to restrain the
unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.”105 State
courts have ruled that this Act permits the use of declaratory judgment
as a means of determining the validity of legislative action.106
It is possible that students could also bring a suit for an injunction
or even damages. In Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover County Board
of Education,107 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that when a
challenge is made under the state constitution, sovereign immunity
cannot act as a bar to the claim.108 North Carolina’s constitutional
“Declaration of Rights” guarantees that all citizens “have a right to the
privilege of education” and promises that “it is the duty of the State to
guard and maintain that right.”109 Thus, if a hypothetical plaintiff
fashioned the claim as one under the “Declaration of Rights,” damages
or injunctive relief would be available as potential remedies.
Moreover, were a student to bring a lawsuit alleging that the State
has violated Article IX, Section 9, the challenge would likely resemble
K–12 education funding cases in North Carolina, where parents have
successfully challenged the State’s funding scheme for public-schools
seeking additional funding.110 Like those parents, students would be
unlikely to face a serious standing challenge because North Carolina
recognizes taxpayer standing.111 This does not mean that North
Carolina’s citizens can challenge policies they “merely disagree
105. Teer v. Jordan, 59 S.E.2d 359, 362 (N.C. 1950).
106. See Town of Emerald Isle v. State, 360 S.E.2d 756, 760 (N.C. 1987) (“A declaratory
judgment may be used to determine the construction and validity of a statute.” (citation omitted)).
107. Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 678 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 2009).
108. Id. at 354. That case relied on Corum v. University of North Carolina, where the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that claims alleging violation by the state of rights contained in the
state constitution’s “Declaration of Rights,” could not be barred by sovereign immunity. Corum
v. Univ. of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276, 290 (N.C. 1992).
109. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 15.
110. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 252 (N.C. 1997) (noting that plaintiffs
challenging “the current school funding system” are “students and their parents or guardians
from . . . relatively poor school systems”).
111. See Goldston v. State, 637 S.E.2d 876, 881 (N.C. 2006) (“[O]ur cases demonstrate that a
taxpayer has standing to bring an action against appropriate government officials for the alleged
misuse or misappropriation of public funds.”).
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with.”112 Still, “the right of a citizen and taxpayer to maintain an action
in the courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury
cannot be denied.”113
B. Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine is invoked when, “[d]espite the
presence of all of the other elements of an Article III case or
controversy, the Court forbears on the ground that something about
the subject matter of the case makes it inappropriate for judicial
resolution.”114 The doctrine has played an outsized role in education
litigation. In the last twenty years, a number of states have ruled that
constitutional challenges to the adequacy of funding of K–12 education
presented non-justiciable political questions.115 Most directly on point,
in Kromko,116 Arizona’s Supreme Court held that the political question
doctrine barred a lawsuit alleging that the State had failed to adhere to
a provision of the State’s constitution that, similar to North Carolina’s
Article IX, Section 9, mandates that higher education be offered for
“as nearly free as possible.”117
One might wonder why a component of the federal courts’
justiciability doctrine would play any role in adjudicating claims
brought under state constitutions. States employ the federal political
question doctrine almost without variation.118 This is, as the Kromko
court explained, because “[t]he federal political question doctrine
flows from the basic principle of separation of powers and recognizes
that some decisions are entrusted under the federal constitution to

112. Id.
113. Teer v. Jordan, 59 S.E.2d 359, 362 (N.C. 1950).
114. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 237 (7th
ed. 2015).
115. See Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in
Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 83,
84 (2010) (“[S]tate courts have delivered a string of disappointing decisions to adequacy plaintiffs.
While those courts have articulated a variety of state-specific rationales for rejecting adequacy
claims, their opinions reveal a common concern with the boundaries between their judicial role
and the prerogatives of the legislature.”).
116. Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 165 P.3d 168 (Ariz. 2007).
117. Id. at 172.
118. See, e.g., id. at 170 (employing the federal political question doctrine); Nelson v.
Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 279, 288 (Haw. 2012) (same).
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branches of government other than the judiciary. . . . [State] courts
refrain from addressing political questions for the same reasons.”119
The political question doctrine is derived from the principle of
separation of powers; a duty—or desire—of the courts not to interfere
with the responsibilities of other branches.120 That concept is a doubleedged sword. Under the separation of powers, it is the responsibility of
courts to determine “whether a matter has . . . been committed by the
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action
of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed.”121
Thus, the fact that a suit involves political matters is not enough to
warrant dismissal.122
On the federal level, in Baker v. Carr,123 the Supreme Court laid
out the factors it looks to in determining whether a dispute presents a
political question.124 And while Baker laid out six factors,125 later cases
have emphasized the importance of two: “a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it.”126
Neither of the central factors of the political question doctrine bar
consideration of Article IX, Section 9.127 Because the North Carolina
Supreme Court has historically played a larger role in expounding
upon the meaning of the State’s constitution, it is unlikely that Article

119. Kromko, 165 P.3d at 170 (citation omitted).
120. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
121. Id. at 211.
122. See id. (“[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”).
123. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
124. Id. at 217.
125. Id. (listing the six factors).
126. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012) (quoting Nixon v.
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)).
127. Nor do any of the remaining factors. Those other factors include:
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. In addition to directing courts’ attention only to the first two factors,
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Zivotofsky noted that courts ordinarily will not find the final
three factors present, especially in cases not dealing with foreign affairs. See Zivotofsky, 566 U.S.
at 204–06 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (explaining how the final three Baker factors are rarely
implicated, but noting cases, mainly in the area of foreign affairs, where they have been relevant).
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IX, Section 9 exudes a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department. In fact,
the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected that very argument in a
challenge to the legislature’s funding of K–12 education.128 Meanwhile,
evidence of the clause’s meaning to those who drafted it and, later, to
those who ensured it was carried forward into the State’s latest
constitution, provides judicially manageable standards.
1. Textually Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment to a
Coordinate Branch. One potential hurdle to a legal challenge involving
Article IX, Section 9 is that the State could argue Article IX, Section 9
commits funding of higher education to the discretion of the
legislature. That argument is unlikely to succeed.
First, North Carolina’s courts specifically have been reluctant to
accept that they lack jurisdiction over challenges involving the meaning
of constitutional text.129
In part because their justices and judges are elected,130 North
Carolina’s courts play a larger role in shaping state policy, at least to
the extent that it involves the state constitution, than do federal courts
in shaping national policy.131 North Carolina courts have historically
helped other branches understand the State’s constitution. Some state
constitutions permit their courts to issue advisory opinions to the
legislature or governor.132 The North Carolina Supreme Court has

128. See Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997) (“Therefore, it is the duty of this
Court to address plaintiff-parties’ constitutional challenge to the state’s public education system.
Defendants’ argument is without merit.”).
129. See id. at 253–54 (citing cases wherein North Carolina courts have assumed the duty to
interpret the constitution, including when government action is challenged as unconstitutional).
130. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
131. Cf. John V. Orth, The Role of the Judiciary in Making Public Policy, in NORTH
CAROLINA FOCUS: AN ANTHOLOGY ON STATE GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, AND POLICY 339, 341
(Mebane Rash Whitman & Ran Coble eds., N.C. Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y Res. 1989) (highlighting the
role of North Carolina judges in making public policy choices by noting the failed movement to
replace common law with statutory law to constrain judicial discretion and the movement towards
having an elected judiciary, as opposed to an appointed judiciary as in the federal courts, to ensure
judges’ accountability as policy-makers).
132. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (“The supreme court shall give its opinion upon
important questions upon solemn occasions when required by the governor, the senate, or the
house of representatives . . . .”); ME. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (“[T]he Supreme Judicial Court shall be
obliged to give their opinion upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions, when
required by the Governor, Senate or House of Representatives.”); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 74
(“Each branch of the legislature as well as the governor and council shall have authority to require
the opinions of the justices of the supreme court upon important questions of law and upon
solemn occasions.”).
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simply issued advisory opinions upon request even absent explicit
constitutional authorization.133
It is therefore unlikely that a court would find Article IX, Section
9 non-justiciable on the grounds that it had been textually committed
to another branch. In fact, the State has already rejected that argument
in a challenge to the legislature’s funding decisions based on a similar
clause also found in Article IX, Section 2. In Leandro v. State,134
plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of funding for the State’s K–12
education system, alleging that it failed to satisfy Article IX, Section
2’s command that “[t]he General Assembly shall provide . . . for a
general and uniform system of free public schools, . . . wherein equal
opportunities shall be provided for all students.”135 The State argued
that the political question doctrine barred the court from proceeding.136
The North Carolina Supreme Court declared that argument meritless,
explaining “[i]t has long been understood that it is the duty of the
courts to determine the meaning of the requirements of our
Constitution.”137
An argument that Article IX, Section 9 is textually committed to
the legislature will likely meet the same fate. Two differences
distinguish Section 2 from Section 9, and neither bears on whether the
matter has been committed to another branch. First, Section 2 governs
primary and secondary education,138 while Section 9 governs higher
education.139 And second, Section 9 does qualify that higher education
must be free “as far as practicable,”140 while Section 2 contains no such
qualification.141 “As far as practicable” is language that must be
interpreted, but as the North Carolina Supreme Court already
explained, “it is the duty of the courts to determine the meaning of the
requirements of our Constitution.”142 Because North Carolina courts
play a significant role in giving meaning to the State’s constitution, and
133. Katherine White, Advisory Opinions: The “Ghosts That Slay,” in NORTH CAROLINA
FOCUS, supra note 131, at 329.
134. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997).
135. Id. at 256.
136. Id. at 253–54.
137. Id. at 253.
138. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (relating to the establishment for a “[u]niform system of
schools”).
139. See id. art. IX, § 9 (relating to “[t]he University of North Carolina and other public
institutions of higher education”).
140. Id.
141. See id. art. IX, § 2 (failing to include the “as far as practicable” qualification).
142. Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 253.
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have already asserted their authority to give meaning to clauses similar
in substance and form to Section 9, a court should not find a question
arising under the clause to be non-justiciable on the grounds that it has
been textually committed to a coordinate branch.
Second, as explained later in this Note, constitutional provisions
imposed contemporaneously with Article IX, Section 9’s antecedent
limited the General Assembly’s discretion.143 It is unlikely that the
drafters would textually commit higher education funding to the
legislature’s discretion while simultaneously limiting the General
Assembly’s discretion about how to fund higher education.
2. Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards. Another
hurdle would be the charge that Article IX, Section 9 lacks judicially
discoverable and manageable standards. That very argument
convinced the Arizona Supreme Court that a challenge to higher
education funding based on Arizona’s constitution was not viable.144
While the Supreme Court has held that “a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving [a controversy]”
makes it non-justiciable,145 the Court has not extensively elucidated
what it means by “judicially discoverable and manageable standards.”
It has suggested, though not held, that the inquiry is guided by the
belief that the absence of such standards in a text is evidence that its
drafters did not intend for judicial interference.146 In Vieth v.
Jubelirer,147 a plurality suggested that sufficiently determinate language
may be necessary.148 In that case, Justice Scalia, writing for himself and
three other justices, dismissed a challenge to partisan gerrymandering,
declaring that “‘[f]airness’ does not seem to us a judicially manageable
143. See infra notes 218–22 and accompanying text (explaining how Sections 5, 15, and 16 of
Article IX of the North Carolina Constitution of 1868 impose additional constraints by,
respectively, requiring the University be held as one with the public common schools, requiring
the General Assembly to appropriate escheats to the University, and requiring the General
Assembly to provide for agriculture and mechanical instruction at the University).
144. See Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 165 P.3d 168, 172 (Ariz. 2007) (“We can conceive
of no judicially discoverable and manageable standards . . . by which we could decide such issues,
either individually or in the aggregate.”).
145. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993).
146. Id. at 228–29 (“[T]he lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the
conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”).
147. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
148. See id. at 293 (explaining that “[s]ome criterion more solid and more demonstrably met”
than “fairness” is “necessary . . . to meaningfully constrain the discretion of the courts, and to win
public acceptance for the courts’ intrusion into a process that is the very foundation of democratic
decisionmaking”).
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standard.”149 For two reasons, this prong of the political question
doctrine does not preclude suit here.
First, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Zivotofsky v. Clinton,150 a case
concerning the relative powers of Congress and the President in
foreign relations decided after Kromko,151 calls into question the
relevance of this prong of the political question doctrine in this case.
Zivotofsky I explained that, at least in the federal context, concerns
about a lack of judicially manageable standards “dissipate . . . when the
issue is recognized to be the more focused one of the constitutionality
of [a statute].”152 In analyzing the constitutionality of the statute at
issue, the Court relied on historical evidence like the minutes of
George Washington’s meetings with his cabinet, the Federalist Papers,
and messages from Andrew Jackson to Congress.153 Similar historical
evidence can be marshalled by a court analyzing the constitutionality
of a statute appropriating funds to the State’s university in relation to
Article IX, Section 9.
Second, Zivotofsky I aside, an exploration of the history of Article
IX, Section 9’s command reveals that the clause does, in fact, contain
judicially discoverable and manageable standards. In the Kromko
litigation, Arizona’s intermediate appellate court noted a lack of such
historical evidence in relation to Title XI, § 6,154 suggesting it could
have given meaning to the clause’s “as nearly free as possible”
language if provided with evidence as to what the clause’s drafters
intended.
A case from Hawaii offers useful parallels. In Nelson v. Hawaiian
Homes Commission,155 the Hawaii Supreme Court used historical
evidence to find judicially manageable standards in the somewhat
obscure language of a provision of the State’s constitution that
required the legislature to appropriate “sufficient sums” to the

149. Id. at 291.
150. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
151. Id. at 196 (noting that the case “involves deciding whether the statute impermissibly
intrudes upon Presidential powers under the Constitution”).
152. Id. at 197.
153. Id. at 197–201.
154. Kromko v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 146 P.3d 1016, 1020 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 165 P.3d 168 (Ariz. 2007) (“[Article 11, Section 6 and Article 11, Section 10]
provoked negligible attention during the adoption of the Arizona Constitution. There is no
historical record of the intent of the framers beyond the words of the constitutional provisions.”).
155. Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 279 (Haw. 2012).
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Department of Hawaiian Home Lands (“DHHL”).156 There, the
Hawaii Supreme Court rejected the State’s contention that the clause
lacked judicially manageable standards and was therefore nonjusticiable, explaining that “the history of the times and the state of
being when the constitutional provision was adopted”157 provided
those standards. The history of DHHL’s role in Hawaii’s constitution
mirrors that of the University of North Carolina. The department,
which was tasked with distributing over 200,000 acres of land that the
federal government had granted the State specifically for use by
descendants of native Hawaiians, historically struggled to fund its
operations.158 Hawaii’s first constitution established the agency, but left
funding of it to the discretion of the legislature.159 The legislature barely
funded the agency, leaving DHHL to lease some of the 200,000 acres
it was granted in order to pay its operational costs.160 Leasing those
lands, of course, meant there was less land for the agency to disperse.161
The justices explored this history, seeking to understand the
dilemma faced by the drafters of Hawaii’s 1978 Constitution.162 Their
analysis includes numerous block quotes from debates of Hawaii’s first
constitution, documents pertaining to the administration of DHHL
prior to the 1978 Constitution, and in some instances unabridged
debates from the drafting of the 1978 Constitution.163 The court began
by acknowledging the relevance of “the history of the times and the
state of being when the constitutional provision was adopted.”164 It
then summarized the conundrum posed by DHHL’s lack of funding,
writing: “In short, in 1978, it was apparent that DHHL was swept up in
a vicious cycle: . . . in order to raise money for administrative and
operating expenses, the department had to lease the vast majority of
its lands that otherwise would have been used for homestead lots.”165
156. Id. at 291–92.
157. Id. at 292 (quoting State v. Kahlbaun, 638 P.2d 309, 315 (Haw. 1981)).
158. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
159. Nelson, 277 P.3d at 292.
160. Id. at 283–84.
161. Id. at 284.
162. See id. at 292 (“In order to give effect to the intention of the framers and the people
adopting a constitutional provision, an examination of the debates, proceedings and committee
reports is useful.” (quoting Kahlbaun, 638 P.2d at 316)).
163. See id. at 292–97 (quoting in large portions Debates in the Committee of the Whole on
Hawaiian Affairs Comm. Prop. No. 11, 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of Hawaii
of 1978 (“1 Proceedings”) (1980)).
164. Id. at 292 (quoting Kahlbaun, 638 P.2d at 315).
165. Id. at 294.
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Next, the court analyzed the provision and its history in light of the
specific problem the drafters were trying to solve.166 Before analyzing
the record of a debate between two delegates about the meaning of
“sufficient,” the court announced its understanding that “[t]he
constitutional convention delegates focused on providing sufficient
sums to DHHL for its administrative and operating expenses in
particular.”167
The court’s understanding that the drafters were attempting to
draft a constitution that resolved a specific problem—insufficient
funding for DHHL, which caused the agency to lease the very land it
was tasked with dispersing—enabled it to bypass much of the fatal
indeterminacy of funding provisions in constitutions. Hawaii argued
that the court could not possibly determine an amount of funding
“sufficient” to operate DHHL without first determining “how many
lots, loans, and rehabilitation projects . . . DHHL must provide.”168 But
the court responded that “[i]t is clear that the constitutional delegates
intended to require appropriation of ‘sufficient sums’ to relieve DHHL
of the burden of general leasing its lands to generate administrative
and operating funds, and to that end, they identified the minimum
funding necessary for such expenses.”169 With its understanding of the
drafters’ intent in mandating a “sufficient sum,” for “administrative
and operational costs,” the court needed only to mine the record of
debate of the 1978 Constitution for what the drafters deemed
“sufficient” to operate DHHL.170 It proved easy to discover, as three
delegates to the 1978 constitutional convention discussed how DHHL
needed from “$1.3 to $1.6 million” to operate.171
The course charted by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Nelson can
guide a court’s effort to find judicially discoverable and manageable
standards in Article IX, Section 9 of North Carolina’s constitution. As
the court in Nelson stated, constitutional provisions should be
interpreted in light of “the history of the times and the state of being
when the constitutional provision was adopted.”172 This historical
inquiry should begin with the 1868 Constitution both because North

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 295–97.
Id. at 295 (emphasis added).
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id. at 296.
Id.
Id. at 292 (quoting State v. Kahlbaun, 638 P.2d 309, 315 (Haw. 1981)).
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Carolina’s present constitution, ratified in 1971, was not intended to
change the substantive rights of citizens or obligations of the
government contained in the State’s 1868 Constitution,173 and because
the language in Article IX, Section 9 first appeared in the 1868
Constitution.174
Like DHHL, the University of North Carolina was established,
but not guaranteed funding, by its State’s first constitution.175 The
drafters of the 1868 Constitution recognized that legislative discretion
in funding the University hindered an attempt to educate the people of
the State,176 just as legislative discretion in Hawaii’s first constitution
inhibited the agency’s efforts to disperse land to descendants of native
Hawaiians.177 Most importantly, drafters of the 1868 Constitution took
steps to remove from the legislature discretion to properly fund—or,
not fund—the University.178 The Nelson court also looked to evidence
of what amount the drafters would have understood as sufficient to
operate the agency at the time of ratification.179 Similarly, a court in
North Carolina could look to what tuition prices the drafters thought
were as free as practicable when they redrafted the State’s constitution
in 1971. With regard to Article IX, Section 9, historical evidence is an
effective means of establishing judicially manageable standards.
III. TEXTUAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE IX,
SECTION 9
That Article IX, Section 9 is justiciable says nothing about the
legal obligation the clause imposes on the state legislature. This Part
aims to elucidate the substance of that obligation. Because much of the

173. See supra Part I.C (explaining that the drafters of the 1971 Constitution did not intend
changing any of the substantive rights guaranteed by the previous constitution).
174. See N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 6, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817 (“The general
assembly shall provide that the benefits of the university, as far as practicable, be extended to the
youth of the State free of expense for tuition . . . .”).
175. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XLI, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2794 (declaring that the
school will be established “with such salaries to the masters, paid by the public, as may enable
them to instruct at low prices”).
176. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining that the University maintained low
academic standards to attract more students).
177. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.
178. See supra Part I.B (detailing how provisions of the 1868 Constitution limited the
legislature’s discretion to defund higher education).
179. See Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 279, 296 (Haw. 2012) (relying on
evidence in the record regarding debate over the new constitution that DHHL required “$1.3 to
$1.6 million” to operate).
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clause’s meaning can be gleaned from its text alone, this Part begins
with a textual analysis of Article IX, Section 9. However, to fully glean
the clause’s meaning, the text alone is insufficient. Thus, this Part
supplements textual analysis with an exploration of the intent of the
drafters the clause’s antecedent in 1868 and the understanding of the
clause’s meaning held by those who carried it over into the State’s
present constitution. This analysis is supported by historical evidence
of the drafters’ conception of the University and its affordability at the
time they wrote the 1868 and 1971 Constitutions.
A. The Text of Article IX, Section 9
North Carolina courts begin any constitutional inquiry with an
analysis of the plain meaning of the text.180 Here, the plain meaning of
Article IX, Section 9 illuminates whom the clause binds, which
universities are included in the promise, what benefits are to be
provided, and what expense is to be free, as far as practicable.
Unfortunately, the text alone cannot give meaning to “as far as
practicable.” Article IX, Section 9 reads: “The General Assembly shall
provide that the benefits of The University of North Carolina and other
public institutions of higher education, as far as practicable, be
extended to the people of the State free of expense.”181 The word
“shall,” makes the language imperative upon the General Assembly,
as “the ordinary meaning of ‘shall’ is ‘must.’”182 That is, the command
to ensure higher education remains accessible is plainly addressed to
the General Assembly. Thus, it is the legislature who is ultimately
responsible for ensuring tuition at the State’s public universities
remains affordable. Quite simply, the General Assembly cannot escape
Article IX, Section 9’s mandate.
A less obvious point is that the “benefits” of the University refer
to the educational instruction it offers. The clause’s predecessor in the
1868 Constitution was clearer on this point because it linked the
“benefits” with “tuition,” reading that the benefits must be offered, “as
far as practicable, free of expense of tuition.”183 That linking is key.
Because the benefits are to be offered without their expense, qualifying
180. Town of Boone v. State, 794 S.E.2d 710, 715 (N.C. 2016) (“We look to the plain meaning
of the [constitutional] phrase to ascertain its intent.”).
181. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 9.
182. Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (noting that “the mandatory ‘shall’” “normally
creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion” (citation omitted)).
183. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 6, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817 (emphasis added).
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expense with tuition also helps to define the benefits. Tuition is defined
as “[t]he action or business of teaching a pupil or pupils.”184
Accordingly, the 1868 Constitution makes plain that it is the
educational instruction that the General Assembly is to subsidize.
The present incarnation omits the word “tuition”185—an omission
the drafters neglected to explain.186 However, because the drafters of
the 1971 Constitution emphasized their intent not to substantively
change the obligations of North Carolina’s constitution,187 the most
logical interpretation of the present clause is that the “benefits” it
refers to remain educational instruction. By extension, the expense that
must be free, as far as practicable, is the expense of instruction. Or, as
the 1868 Constitution described it, “tuition.”188 That revelation is
responsive to those who argue that the cost of college has risen because
of an increase in fees associated with room, board, and facilities like
student centers or gyms. Those commentators have a point; the
addition of new—and the increase of existing—fees is, arguably,
responsible for at least some of the increase in the real cost of
attendance.189 That proposition is contested; others suggest that cost of
attendance has risen as a result of tuition increases sparked by a
reduction in state support for public universities.190 Regardless, fees
cannot explain why tuition has risen, as the two are separate
expenses.191
The benefits must come from “[t]he University of North Carolina
and other public institutions of higher education.”192 The latter half of
the phrase is redundant because, importantly, all sixteen of the State’s
public universities constitute The University of North Carolina.193 The

184. Tuition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
185. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 9.
186. CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 86–88 (discussing the provision
without explaining the omission).
187. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
188. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 6, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817.
189. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Selingo, The Hidden Cost of College: Rising Student Fees, WASH. POST
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2017/08/24/the-hiddencost-of-college-rising-student-fees/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.af015277a6dc [https://perma.cc/
SAL8-8VLM] (explaining that increased student fees and increased costs in room and board are
responsible for the increased costs of higher education).
190. Webber, supra note 27.
191. See UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, TUITION & FEES ACADEMIC YEAR 2017-2018,
supra note 24 (listing “tuition” and “fees” separately and combining the two to produce a “total”).
192. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 9.
193. 220 Years of History, supra note 21.
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“other public institutions of higher education” language is the product
of a historical anachronism. At the time of the 1971 Constitution’s
drafting, the State’s public universities operated separately.194 The
drafters were merely attempting to recognize that, since the drafting of
the 1868 Constitution, the State had established additional public
universities.195 A year after the adoption of the present constitution,
the legislature placed all of the public universities within one
“University of North Carolina,”196 rendering language about other
public universities redundant.
“[P]eople of the state,” refers to the citizens of North Carolina.
For this text of the clause alone, extensive statutory language exists.
The legislature requires one not only to have been domiciled in the
State for twelve or more months, but also to have been domiciled “for
purposes of maintaining a bona fide domicile rather than of
maintaining a mere temporary residence or abode incident to
enrollment in an institution of higher education.”197
Finally, “as far as practicable.” The definition of “practicable”—
“able to be done or put into practice successfully”198—is far from
clarifying. And looking elsewhere in the constitution’s text is hardly
helpful. The phrase does appear one other place, in Article III, Section
11 where the legislature is directed to, no later than 1975, have grouped
“all administrative departments, agencies, and offices of the State,”
into “principal administrative departments so as to group them as far
as practicable according to major purposes.”199 The drafters made no
attempt to explain the meaning of this clause in their commentary.200
Nor is the text of the clause’s historical antecedent in the 1868
Constitution illuminating. While the phrase “as far as practicable,” and
similar iterations like “as soon as practicable,” appear multiple times

194. See id. (“In 1971 legislation was passed bringing into the University of North Carolina
the state’s ten remaining public senior institutions, each of which had until then been legally
separate . . . .”).
195. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
196. The North Carolina Constitution was presented to voters and approved in 1970. Orth,
supra note 34, at 1760. The universities were combined into one system in 1971. 220 Years of
History, supra note 21.
197. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-143.1(c) (2014).
198. Practicable, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed.1989).
199. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 11 (emphasis added).
200. See CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 77–78 (omitting discussion of
the clause in the discussion of Article III).
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in the record of debates at the constitutional convention, the drafters
declined to explain its meaning.201
While there is little that can be gleaned about the clause’s meaning
from its use in those instances, this analysis does reveal that the
language was not understood to detract from the forcefulness of the
command to the legislature. For example, the convention passed a
resolution calling for North Carolina to be reunited with the federal
government—the paramount concern for Reconstructionist
governments in the South—“at the earliest day practicable.”202
Elsewhere, the convention passed a resolution calling for a committee
report on the establishment of a government in North Carolina to be
submitted “as soon as practicable.”203 The entire convention lasted only
from January 14, 1868 to March 17, 1868.204 Thus, “as soon as
practicable” was not understood to allow for some delay. Yet the
phrase did not just relate to temporal urgency. In adopting the rules of
procedure for the convention, it was resolved that the “Rules of Order
of the Convention of this State for 1865–66 . . . be adopted . . . so far as
practicable.”205 There is no subsequent mention of the substitution of
another code of procedure because those rules of orders were
impracticable.
Language similar to “as far as practicable” was even used in
relation to higher education. Article IX, Section 16 requires that “[a]s
soon as practicable after the adoption of this constitution the general
assembly shall establish and maintain, in connection with the
university, a department of agriculture, of mechanics, of mining and of
normal instruction.”206 Here, the General Assembly did not view the
“as soon as practicable” language as detracting from the mandate—it
conditioned reopening the University in 1875 on developing a program
in agriculture and mechanics.207
201. See generally JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
NORTH-CAROLINA (1868) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION]
(demonstrating that the phrases came up in multiple iterations during the debates).
202. Id. at 32–33.
203. Id. at 30–31.
204. Id. at 4, 481.
205. Id. at 12.
206. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 16, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2818.
207. As William D. Snider’s historical account of the University of North Carolina explains:
After prolonged study the trustees saw their only hope in persuading the General
Assembly to revalidate the agricultural and mechanical college Land Scrip Fund,
obtained by Governor Swain from the federal government in 1867 under the Morrill
Act. [Due to the Board of Trustees having lost that money in a bond scandal, t]he state
remained responsible to the federal government for restoring the principal, but in a
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While textual analysis of “as far as practicable” illuminates the
drafters’ intent to require the founders to provide adequate funding for
higher education, we must look elsewhere to discover what the
founders deemed adequate.
B. Original Meaning
The same historical evidence that provided judicially manageable
standards also lends support to the conclusion that a tuition of roughly
$1450 is as free as practicable. Historical evidence is often used to give
meaning to constitutional text.208 This is particularly true where the
intent of the drafters can clarify a clause’s meaning.209 For example, in
Heller v. District of Columbia,210 the Supreme Court employed
historical context to give meaning to the grammatical ambiguity in the
text of the Second Amendment.211 And, in Nelson, the Hawaii Supreme
Court not only relied on historical evidence to find a challenge to the
adequacy of funding of the Hawaiian Homes Commission justiciable,
but also to arrive at a precise dollar amount the legislature was
required to appropriate.212
When expounding upon the meaning of its constitution, North
Carolina courts must “interpret the organic law in accordance with the
intent of its framers and the citizens who adopted it.”213 Because of the
similar constitutional histories of DHHL and the University of North
Carolina,214 to resolve the meaning of “as far as practicable,” a court
examining the North Carolina Constitution should, like the Nelson
closely contested fight the General Assembly authorized the state to pay an annual sum
of $7500 to the university as interest on the money, provided the university offered
agricultural and mechanical instruction.
SNIDER, supra note 12, at 89–90 (emphasis added).
208. Emil A. Kleinhaus, Note, History as Precedent: The Post-Originalist Problem in
Constitutional Law, 110 YALE L.J. 121, 121 (2000).
209. See id. at 122 (“In order to elucidate the original meaning of the vague terms that pervade
the Constitution, Justices often either delve into primary sources or rely on historians to explain
those sources.”).
210. Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
211. See Kerr v. Hickenlooper, 744 F.3d 1156, 1178 (10th Cir. 2014) (“There is no evidence
that the Court in Heller even considered the possibility that the [historical] sources available to it
could be insufficient for developing judicially discoverable and manageable standards.”), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 2927 (2015).
212. Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 279, 297 (Haw. 2012).
213. Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 264 S.E.2d 106, 110 (N.C. 1980).
214. See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the parallel histories of DHHL and UNC. Both were
established in their state’s first constitution but failed to receive adequate funding in the years
following the ratification of those constitutions. Only after subsequent constitutions required the
legislature to provide financial support did both flourish financially).
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court, look to the history of the problem that the drafters were
attempting to resolve. In Nelson, the court understood that the drafters
were attempting to prevent the legislature from severely underfunding
DHHL so as to cause the agency to have to lease some of its land to
cover its operating costs.215 This understanding informed the court’s
examination of the historical record as a standard for “sufficient sum,”
namely, whatever the operating costs were for DHHL.216 Similarly,
when the drafters of North Carolina’s 1868 Constitution wrote that
higher education should be as free as practicable, they were seeking to
alleviate the crippling financial burden the University was saddled with
after the legislature took from it the proceeds of the State’s escheats.217
Thus, a court need only look for evidence of what the drafters of the
1868 Constitution thought would be necessary to ensure the legislature
could not underfund the university.
As in Nelson, there is little difficulty in finding that evidence in the
historical record surrounding the Education section of North
Carolina’s constitution. While the Nelson court had to mine convention
debates to find a standard, the drafters of North Carolina’s 1868
Constitution put the standards in its text. Because the drafters chose to
remove from the legislature’s powers even the ability to reclaim the
escheats by granting the escheats to the University in the
constitution,218 it seems safe to assume that one source of funding they
thought necessary to ensure the University’s fiscal health was the very
escheats the legislature had first appropriated to the University in 1789
before attempting to retake them. So essential to the University were
escheats, the drafters believed, that they reversed the legislature’s
actions and preserved the reversal in Article IX, Section 15.219
Moreover, in Article IX, Section 16, the drafters required the
legislature to work with the University to provide “agricultural and

215. Nelson, 277 P.3d at 294–95.
216. Id. at 297.
217. See supra Part I.B (explaining how the drafters of the 1868 Constitution imposed limits
on the legislature’s discretion with regard to funding as a response to the years of underfunding).
218. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 15, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2818.
219. In 1800, the legislature passed a measure removing escheats as a source of funding for
the University, but the North Carolina Supreme Court invalidated that law. See CONSTITUTION
STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 138 (noting that the North Carolina Supreme Court
invalidated the legislature’s attempt to repeal the escheats statute of 1789 “on the ground that it
constituted a taking of vested property other than by the law of the land, in violation of the
constitution”). The 1868 Constitution required escheats to be awarded to the University, denying
the legislature the opportunity to take back the escheats by statute as it tried to do in 1800. N.C.
CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 15, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2818.
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mechanical education”220—an implicit command that the legislature
work to ensure eligibility for Morrill Act land grants.221 Thus, funds
from the proceeds of lands granted to the State through the Morrill Act
were also thought to be required to make tuition as free as possible.
And, in Section 5, the drafters declared that the University was to be
“held to an inseparable connection with the free public-school system
of the State,”222 evincing a commitment by the State to ensure that
higher education was similarly, if not precisely, as affordable as the free
K–12 system. Thus, “as free as practicable” encompassed efforts to
ensure the University’s accessibility approached that of the free publicschool system.
Unlike in Nelson, the recorded debates of the drafting of North
Carolina’s 1868 Constitution do not specify an amount the drafters
thought was appropriate for tuition.223 However, the actions taken by
the drafters led to a substantial decrease in tuition, down to $60224 from
$80225 when the University reopened in 1875. Tuition remained at
$60—with brief exception in the 1880s—until 1924.226
Had no developments in North Carolina’s constitutional history
occurred since the 1868 Constitution, this evidence might not be
sufficient to find judicially discoverable standards. The price of tuition
in response to the 1868 Constitution is persuasive evidence of the price
the drafters envisioned, but not nearly as dispositive as drafters
specifying a requisite amount in debates, as was the case in Nelson. But
the citizens of North Carolina reaffirmed that commitment by ratifying
the constitution of 1971, which did not “impair any present right of the
individual citizen” nor “bring about any fundamental change in the
power of state . . . government or the distribution of that power.”227 At
the time the constitution was being redrafted and ratified, tuition prices

220. Id. art. IX, § 16, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2818.
221. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
222. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 5, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817.
223. Compare Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 279, 296 (Haw. 2012) (quoting
a delegate to Hawaii’s constitutional convention as saying DHHL needed “$1.3 to $1.6 million”
to operate), with JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 201 (lacking a
reference to dollar amount that would suffice a tuition that is free, as far as practicable).
224. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE
UNIV. OF N.C. 1869-’70, at 15 (1870).
225. UNIV. OF N.C., CATALOGUE OF THE TRUSTEES, FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE
UNIV. OF N.C., 1875-’76, at 13 (1876).
226. See UNIV. OF N.C., THE CATALOGUE 1923-24, at 61 (1924) (showing a tuition in 1924 of
$20 per quarter, for a total of $80 per year).
227. CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 10.
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were, adjusted for inflation, remarkably similar to prices when the
University first reopened under the 1868 Constitution. Moreover, in
the century that had passed since North Carolina ratified the 1868
Constitution, tuition prices had, adjusted for inflation, remained
remarkably stable.228
Article IX, Section 9 in the 1971 Constitution should be viewed as
constitutionalizing this stable tuition price—around $1450 in 2017
dollars—for three reasons.229
First, though the record is sparse, it is likely that the drafters of the
1971 Constitution were aware of the tuition prices of the day. It is
evident that they were generally aware of the state of public higher
education in North Carolina, as they made technical corrections to the
wording of some provisions, including to Article IX, Section 9, to
account for changes that had occurred since the 1868 Constitution.230
Many of the drafters attended the University,231 so they must have been
aware of the low cost of tuition, at least when they attended. North
Carolina courts have recognized that some background knowledge
may be imputed to lawmakers,232 and should impute to the drafters a
general understanding of the state of higher education.
Second, the drafters constitutionalized other contemporary
practices in higher education. Their treatment of escheats is illustrative.
One of the few changes the drafters of the 1971 Constitution did make
to the Education section of the constitution was to the escheats
provision. Instead of committing the escheats to the University to use
for any purpose, as the 1868 Constitution had done, the drafters

228. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
229. An amount of $60 in 1875 would be worth $1,337.02 in 2017, adjusted for inflation as
calculated and discussed in supra note 4.
230. See CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 88 (“Proposed Sec. 8 extends
present Sec. 6 (which deals only with the University [of North Carolina at Chapel Hill]) to take
account of the duty of the State to maintain institutions of higher education in addition to the
University of North Carolina [at Chapel Hill].”).
231. For just a couple of examples, Chairman of the Drafting Committee Emery B. Denny
attended UNC Law School. N.C. SUP. CT. HIST. SOC., EMERY B. DENNY,
https://ncschs.net/justices-portraits/denny-emery-b [https://perma.cc/R36M-8A6L] (last visited
Sept. 1, 2018). Vice Chairman Archie Davis attended UNC Chapel Hill. See Scott Huler, The Man
and Plan Behind Research Triangle Park, OUR STATE (Aug. 25, 2014),
https://www.ourstate.com/research-triangle-park [https://perma.cc/J6ZR-PGGY].
232. See Kornegay Family Farms LLC v. Cross Creek Seed, Inc., 803 S.E.2d 377, 382 (N.C.
2017) (“[T]he legislature is always presumed to act with full knowledge of prior and existing
law . . . .” (quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 507 S.E.2d 284, 294 (N.C. 1998))).
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required that proceeds from the interest of the State’s escheats be used
to provide scholarships for low-income students in the State.233
In their notes, drafters explain that this change was actually just a
preservation of the status quo.234 As explained above, in 1946 UNCChapel Hill felt its state funding was sufficient to allow the University
to cease drawing from the principle of the escheats.235 Moreover,
because of generous state funding through regular appropriations, the
Board of Trustees no longer felt the need to use escheats to cover
operational costs and instead began using escheats exclusively to fund
scholarships for low-income students.236
The drafters’ treatment of escheats only makes sense if one
accepts that they viewed the tuition prices of the day as satisfying
Article IX, Section 9’s language. In 1868, granting the University
escheats to use as a means of covering operational costs was the
primary way that the drafters ensured that the General Assembly
fulfilled its obligation to ensure that higher education was “as far as
practicable, free of expense.”237 If the drafters of the 1971 Constitution
did not believe that the State was meeting the obligation to ensure that
higher education remained affordable by funding higher education
through other avenues, then it would make little sense for them to have
precluded the universities from using the escheats to cover operational
costs, keeping tuition prices low for everyone. Viewed this way, North
Carolina’s century-long experience with low and stable tuition prices is
analogous to, if not a one-for-one substitution for, the record of
DHHL’s operation costs included in debates during the drafting of
Hawaii’s 1978 Constitution. Just as the Nelson court identified those
records as a judicially discoverable standard,238 a court in North
Carolina could identify the low and stable tuition prices with which the
drafters of the 1971 Constitution were familiar as a judicially
discoverable standard contained within Article IX, Section 9.

233. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 10(2) (“All property . . . from escheats, unclaimed dividends,
or distributive shares of the estate of deceased persons shall be used to aid worthy and needy
students who are residents of the State and are enrolled in public institutions of higher education
in this State.”).
234. CONSTITUTION STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 39, at 138–39 (noting that Amendment
No. 10 to the 1971 constitution preserves the practice of distributing escheats among “needy
North Carolina residents” with modifications to accommodate the expanding university system).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. See supra Part I.B.
238. Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 277 P.3d 279, 297 (Haw. 2012).
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IV. POSSIBLE REMEDIES REQUIRED BY AN ARTICLE IX, SECTION 9
CHALLENGE
While the focus of this Note was to discern the meaning of Article
IX, Section 9, the clause’s meaning is of little value if the rights it grants
cannot be vindicated. There exist three possible remedies that courts
may grant in the event of a suit by students. The first, judicial
imposition of roughly $1450 as the cost of tuition at state universities,
is the one that most logically follows from the above analysis, but may
prove to be most problematic. The second remedy, a remand to the
General Assembly to appropriate sufficient funds, is one that most
states’ courts—including those of North Carolina—have been most
comfortable imposing in education funding cases, but which often
results in decades of litigation producing few results. The third and
final remedy would involve the court requiring the legislature to
consider certain relevant data about the cost of higher education,
drawing inspiration from the Wyoming Supreme Court’s response to
the failures of the remand described above.
A. Inflation-Adjusted Pricing
Article IX, Section 9’s command that higher education be “as far
as practical, free of expense,”239 represents the constitutionalization of
a particular price for tuition at the State’s universities, namely around
$1450 per year when adjusted for inflation.240 The most logical remedy,
therefore, would be for a court to mandate that the legislature set the
price of tuition at $1450 and allow it to be increased only in response
to inflation.
Mechanically, a judicial mandate of educational funding would
not be difficult to accomplish. While the legislature has generally
delegated responsibility for setting the cost of tuition at the State’s
universities to the UNC Board of Governors,241 it has set tuition prices
at some of the State’s universities by statute.242 Nothing would prevent
the legislature from amending the statutes to require tuition be set at
$1450 if so mandated by a court. However, because this remedy does
not necessarily require the legislature to actually provide funding
necessary to lower tuition, it could do little to lower the cost of
239. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 9.
240. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
241. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 116-143(a) (2014).
242. See id. § 116-143.11(a) (setting tuition at Elizabeth City State University, the University
of North Carolina at Pembroke, and Western Carolina University at $500 per semester).
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attendance at the State’s public universities. The legislature could pass
a statute setting tuition at $1450 but appropriate no additional funds,
leaving universities with a significant revenue gap.
Most likely, making up the gap becomes an exercise in relabeling
costs. In addition to tuition, which is addressed by the State’s
constitution, colleges charge fees, which were not mentioned by Article
IX, Section 9’s antecedent in the 1868 Constitution.243 These fees relate
to everything from room, board, and library usage to recreational
facilities and athletics.244 Fees could easily be increased to offset the lost
revenue. In fact, some argue that the somewhat recent explosion in fees
charged by colleges is an attempt to do just that.245
This would be antithetical to the purpose of Article IX, Section 9
and the intent of the drafters of the clause’s historical antecedent in the
Constitution of 1868. As explained above, the clause was meant to
ensure that the expenses associated with educational instruction were
subsidized by the State.246 The State cannot satisfy its constitutional
mandate merely by relabeling the costs it assigns to students.
When the drafters of North Carolina’s 1868 Constitution first
declared that the State must offer higher education as free as
practicable, they took steps to ensure that the General Assembly kept
tuition low by robustly funding the University.247 The same must be
true of any court’s attempt to ensure that the legislature is satisfying
the constitutional mandate today.
A court could itself determine an acceptable amount and order
the General Assembly to pay it, but that outcome is almost impossible
to imagine. North Carolina’s Supreme Court has explained that
“appellate courts have tempered language about broad inherent power
endemic to the status of the judiciary as a co-equal branch of
government with self-restraint regarding the reach into the public
fisc.”248 Other courts, faced with a similar question in regard to the

243. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, § 6, in 5 THORPE, supra note 1, at 2817.
244. See STUDENT FEES, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, https://cashier.unc.edu/tuitionfees/student-fees [https://perma.cc/YFM3-DVM4] (last visited Nov. 23, 2017) (listing, among
others, fees for athletics, student organizations, the student endowed library fund, and campus
recreation).
245. Selingo, supra note 189.
246. See supra Part I.B.
247. Id.
248. In re Alamance Cty. Court Facilities, 405 S.E.2d 125, 132 (N.C. 1991).
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adequacy of funding for K–12 education have refused to order a
specific dollar amount in deference to separation of powers.249
B. “Remand” to the General Assembly
Another potential remedy is for a court to direct the General
Assembly to pass new legislation regarding higher education funding
after considering the meaning given to Article IX, Section 9 by the
court. This remedy is common in challenges to the adequacy of K–12
education funding under a state constitution.250 Unfortunately, most
often this remedy results in years’ worth of litigation, as cases pingpong between the legislature, trial courts, and the state supreme
court.251
North Carolina’s Leandro v. State, a challenge to the adequacy of
the State’s funding of public K–12 education that first began in 1996,252
is emblematic of this approach and its flaws. In that case, students from
poor, rural school districts in the northeastern corner of the State
alleged that funding for K–12 education was insufficient to “meet the
minimal standard for a constitutionally adequate education.”253
Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that, due to a lack of funding, they had
“inadequate school facilities”; “sparse and outdated book collections”
and technology; difficulty “compet[ing] for high quality teachers”;
unwieldy class sizes; and low test scores.254 The plaintiffs argued that
these conditions showed that the State was failing its constitutional
249. See Gannon v. State, 402 P.3d 513, 552 (Kan. 2017) (“Consistent with our practice in this
case, we decline to provide a specific minimal amount to reach constitutional adequacy.”).
250. See, e.g., id. at 553 (declining “to provide a specific minimal amount [of funding] to reach
constitutional adequacy” and directing the legislature to conduct further evaluation); Hoke Cty.
Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 393 (N.C. 2004) (noting that “when the State fails to live up
to its constitutional duties, a court is empowered to order the deficiency remedied” and, if the
government fails to do so, “impos[e] a specific remedy and instruct[]the recalcitrant actors to
implement it”); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 780 S.E.2d 609, 610 (S.C. 2015) (mem.)
(ordering the legislature to “[w]ithin one week of the conclusion of the 2016 legislative session . . .
submit a written summary to the Court detailing their efforts to implement a constitutionally
compliant education system, including all proposed, pending, or enacted legislation”).
251. See, e.g., Gannon, 402 P.3d at 517–18 (noting that the opinion was the fifth in a series of
school finance decisions that involved “[a] series of other panel decisions, legislative enactments,
and four [Kansas Supreme Court] decisions”); Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95CVS1158,
2000 WL 1639686, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000), aff’d in part as modified and rev’d in part,
358 N.C. 605 (N.C. 2004) (noting that the case had originated six years prior in 1994); Abbeville
Cty. Sch. Dist., 780 S.E.2d at 609–10 (listing the procedural history of the case involving state
governor and legislature).
252. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 251–52 (N.C. 1997).
253. Id. at 252.
254. Id.
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duty to provide “for a general and uniform system of free public
schools . . . wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all
students.”255 The court agreed, holding that the State’s constitution
required the General Assembly to provide students a “sound basic
education,” which the court defined by listing the skills such an
education would impart to students.256
Though the North Carolina Supreme Court ultimately remanded
the case to the trial court, it stated its belief that the legislature, with
some guidance, was best positioned to remedy the failure.257 In that
vein, the court wrote “the legislative process provides a better forum
than the courts for discussing and determining what educational
programs and resources are most likely to ensure that each child of the
state receives a sound basic education.”258 The trial court took the
North Carolina Supreme Court’s hint, directing the legislature to craft
legislation remedying any deficiencies it identified and retaining
jurisdiction of the case until it was satisfied by the legislature’s
response.259 For example, after finding that students in low-income
areas were entering kindergarten less prepared than their counterparts
in wealthier school districts, the court directed the legislature to design
and fund a system of early childhood education for certain low-income
counties.260
The problem with this approach is that it inevitably results in
remarkably lengthy litigation. In fact, as recently as 2013, more than
seventeen years after the initial suit was filed in Leandro, the North
Carolina Supreme Court was hearing arguments about the sufficiency
of the early childhood education system the legislature had created
after the trial court’s directive in 2000.261 And while North Carolina’s
litigation led to some concrete results, including the creation of a
statewide early childhood education system,262 other states have
255. Id. at 254 (quoting N.C. CONST. art IX, § 2(1)).
256. Id. at 255.
257. Id. at 259.
258. Id.
259. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, No. 95CVS1158, 2000 WL 1639686, at *11, *113 (N.C.
Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 2000), aff’d in part as modified and rev’d in part, 599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 2004).
260. Id. at *112–14.
261. See Brief for Appellee at 2–4, Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 752 S.E.2d 501 (N.C.
2013) (No. 5PA12-2) (summarizing the procedural history and demonstrating that the litigation
remains ongoing).
262. See Christina Samuels, N.C. Supreme Court to Decide on Pre-K Funding, EDUC. WEEK
(Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2013/10/30/10preschool.h33.html [https://
perma.cc/48YS-222D] (noting the 2001 launching of More At Four, a “state-funded preschool
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experienced similarly lengthy litigation without the results. Since the
case’s filing in 2010, the Kansas Supreme Court has issued six opinions
in Gannon v. State,263 a state constitutional challenge to the legislature’s
funding of K–12 education, with its most recent opinions being handed
down in October 2017 and June 2018.264 Each time, it has found the
legislature to have failed to satisfy its commands.265 As recently as 2015,
South Carolina was still holding proceedings related to Abbeville
County School District v. State,266 a 1999 challenge to the adequacy of
funding for K–12 education under the state constitution.267
Regardless of whether the litigation has been effective, it appears
state courts nationwide are growing weary.268 In an expansive survey of
litigation challenging the adequacy of funding for K–12 education,
Julia Simon-Kerr and Robynn Sturm list examples from, among other
states, South Carolina, Massachusetts, and Texas where courts that
once eagerly engaged with adequacy litigation now appear to be

program” that “became one of the best-regarded state-funded preschool programs in the
country”).
263. Gannon v. State, 402 P.3d 513 (Kan. 2017).
264. See id. at 517 (“This is the fifth school finance decision involving these parties and Article
6 of the Kansas Constitution, which imposes a duty on the legislature to ‘make suitable provision
for finance of the educational interests of the state.’” (citation omitted)); Gannon v. State, 420
P.3d 477, 480 (Kan. 2018) (noting that Gannon stayed the issuance of the mandate to “g[i]ve the
State ample time to . . . [bring] the K–12 public education financing system into constitutional
compliance”).
265. Gannon, 402 P.3d at 521–23.
266. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 780 S.E.2d 609 (S.C. 2015).
267. See id. at 610–11 (reviewing the legislature’s plan for complying with the South Carolina
Constitution’s education mandate and retaining jurisdiction over the matter to review that plan).
268. Julia A. Simon-Kerr and Robynn K. Sturm aptly summarize this trend, explaining:
A close reading of recent opinions reveals three primary ways in which the changing
education landscape has heightened separation of powers concerns for courts
adjudicating second-generation cases. First, courts are troubled by the increasingly
intrusive remedial role seemingly demanded in order to improve school systems that
have already undergone significant reforms. This failure to perceive an acceptable
remedial role can lead courts to abdicate their function entirely in adequacy
adjudication, essentially, if not overtly, reversing any positive precedent. Second, signs
of renewed political engagement and progress (however minimal) may cause courts to
question the very legitimacy of judicial intervention. Over the years, a powerful strain
of argument has developed maintaining that the judiciary should only engage in
structural reform litigation in the face of egregious political neglect. In courts that
subscribe to this view, plaintiffs will struggle to convince judges that anything more
than perfunctory oversight on their part is constitutionally permitted, let alone
necessary, when the legislature is also actively involved. Finally, improved schools
further blur the already uncertain line delineating breach. Where ambiguous
constitutional standards and steadily improving conditions pose tricky line-drawing
problems, courts are much more likely to defer to the judgment of the legislature.
Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 115, at 97–98.
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seeking an exit.269 Because these remedies have resulted in prolonged
litigation, Simon-Kerr and Sturm have advocated abandoning them
altogether.270
C. Procedural Remedies
A third potential remedy would have the court act not through
directives to the legislature, but rather as a backstop to it. This method
would ensure compliance with the state constitution by examining
whether the legislature undertook constitutionally relevant
considerations in appropriating funds to the university system. The
Supreme Court has employed this technique in determining whether
Congress abrogated state sovereign immunity. For example, in Board
of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,271 the Supreme
Court held that Congress had improperly abrogated state sovereign
immunity in Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act because,
though it made findings that “historically, society has tended to isolate
and segregate individuals with disabilities,”272 it failed to make the
necessary finding that state action historically caused the isolation and
segregation.273
The Wyoming Supreme Court employed a similar technique after
becoming frustrated with the ineffectiveness of its initial directive to
the State legislature in a K–12 funding case.274 Rather than issue
another directive its elected representatives might ignore, the court
opted to search the record of debate of school funding legislation for
evidence that elected officials had considered relevant factors.275
The Wyoming court’s approach to adjudicating the adequacy of
funding for at-risk students is illustrative. Previously, the court had
ruled that the State’s funding for at-risk students was insufficient and
“not based upon actual costs of the necessary programs” and directed

269. Id. at 121 (recommending that education advocates challenging the adequacy of funding
“must find a way to recharacterize both the right and the remedy so that they cannot be boiled
down to a demand for increased funding”).
270. Id. at 121–23. The authors recommend moving beyond remedies involving money,
highlighting a South Carolina case where the trial judge ordered the creation of a statewide
preschool program and a Wyoming case where the court looked at the factors considered by the
court in developing a funding formula for schools with large “at-risk” student populations. Id.
271. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
272. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2012).
273. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368–69.
274. Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 115, at 122 n.184.
275. Id.
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the State to provide more funds.276 Yet the issue returned to
Wyoming’s highest court when a suit was filed alleging that the
legislature had failed to heed the court’s directive. The justices declined
to again attempt to determine if the funding was sufficient.277 Instead,
they asked if, since the court’s last decision, the State had improved its
process for determining funding for at-risk students.278
First, the court described the State’s old method, which used
participation in free or reduced cost lunch programs as a proxy for atrisk status and thus based funding off of that number alone.279 Next, the
court described how the State had engaged a consultant to craft a
better mechanism for determining at-risk status.280 Under the new
method, the State looked not at participation in the free or reduced
lunch program, but in eligibility for it, recognizing that some parents
might elect not to have their children participate, but that the parent’s
election not to participate did not preclude the student from being “atrisk.”281 Moreover, the State considered additional factors that might
make one “at-risk,” like English Language Proficiency and whether
one has frequently changed schools.282 This inquiry satisfied the court,
which deemed the State’s plan constitutional, writing “[t]here is little
question that the state exerted significant effort to develop a fair and
accurate method of estimating the additional cost of addressing at-risk
students.”283
This framework tracks the least with the intent of the drafters of
Article IX, Section 9 and its historical antecedent. As explained above,
the drafters of the 1971 Constitution had in mind a particular price they
had identified as satisfying Article IX, Section 9’s mandate that higher
education in the State be as free as practicable.284 By contrast, this
remedy would merely ask if the legislature had considered factors
relevant to affordability in appropriating funds.
276. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 181 P.3d 43, 57–58 (Wyo. 2008).
277. See id. at 59 (affirming lower court’s finding that the legislature responded property to
the court’s directive even though its funding calculation does not capture “all of the possible atrisk students or all of the possible costs necessary to address their particular problems” because
“[t]here are too many variables involved in the at-risk issue to expect precision in estimating the
costs of educating these students”).
278. Id. at 58–59.
279. Id. at 58.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 58–59.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 59.
284. See supra notes 229–38 and accompanying text.
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It also raises separation of powers issues. The North Carolina
Supreme Court has explained that the legislature is better equipped to
make decisions regarding education funding because its members are
“popularly elected,” and “it can hear and consider the views of the
general public as well as educational experts.”285 At the same time, “the
judicial branch has its duty under the North Carolina Constitution” and
must “issue . . . relief as needed to correct [a constitutional] wrong.”286
Still, this remedy has its advantages. For one thing, it is conscious
of the complexity of funding education in the twenty-first century.
Those complexities are extensive in higher education, even if one
focuses only on tuition. Some courses of study are more expensive than
others.287 The market for faculty at doctoral or master’s degreegranting universities may involve higher salaries.288 By policing the
process of appropriating funds to ensure affordability is considered, a
court need not worry that the tuition price it mandates is unworkably
low at some universities, while a windfall for others. This was not a
problem faced by the drafters of the 1868 Constitution, who knew of
only one state-supported university.
Moreover, speaking realistically, North Carolina’s legislature
could benefit from outside policing of how it appropriates funds. The
legislature is part-time.289 Legislators are paid around $14,000 in base
pay a year, meaning most are occupied by another full-time job.290 It is
not difficult to imagine that North Carolina’s legislators lack sufficient
indicia of affordability in a way analogous to how the Wyoming
Legislature lacked sufficient indicia of what constituted an “at-risk”
student.

285. Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259 (N.C. 1997).
286. Id. at 261.
287. Scott Jaschik, Study Finds Variation in Costs by Different Majors, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2017/01/09/study-finds-variationcosts-different-majors [https://perma.cc/J42B-97GX].
288. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, VISUALIZING CHANGE: THE
ANNUAL REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE PROFESSION, 2016-17, at 14 (2017),
https://www.aaup.org/file/FCS_2016-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/M66H-8WFV] (reporting average
salaries for professors at doctorate granting institutions in 2016-17 was $132,741, while average
pay for professors at Master’s and Baccalaureate granting institutions was $94,950 and $90,368
respectively).
289. Patrick Gannon, Here’s What NC Legislators Took Home in State Pay in 2015, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Feb. 27, 2016, 7:18 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/politicsgovernment/state-politics/article62863302.html [https://perma.cc/NTY7-YFG9].
290. Id.
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CONCLUSION

In 1776, the drafters of North Carolina’s constitution promised its
citizens an unparalleled public university. Ninety years later, the
drafters of North Carolina’s 1868 constitution strengthened that
promise by guaranteeing that higher education would be accessible to
all, a promise backed up by provisions requiring the General Assembly
to supply financial support necessary to ensure the University was
affordable. In 1971, as the fruits of that promise cemented the State’s
legacy as a leader of the American South, it reaffirmed that guarantee
once more. Today, the UNC System has blossomed to include sixteen
universities, and UNC-Chapel Hill stands as the nation’s oldest public
institution of higher education. But the financial vagaries of the Great
Recession tested the State’s commitment to that promise and, while
college tuition remains lower in North Carolina than many states, some
early evidence suggests North Carolina is beginning to falter on its
constitutional obligation. Article IX, Section 9 requires the General
Assembly to provide to the State’s citizens higher education at a cost
of no more than $1450 per year, adjusted for inflation. Should the
General Assembly fail to adhere to this constitutional imperative,
citizens should turn to the State’s courts to vindicate their rights. And,
in those courts, they should prevail.

